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Abstract
When explaining others’ behaviors, achievements, and failures, it is common for people to attribute too much influence to
disposition and too little influence to structural and situational factors. We examine whether this tendency leads even
experienced professionals to make systematic mistakes in their selection decisions, favoring alumni from academic
institutions with high grade distributions and employees from forgiving business environments. We find that candidates
benefiting from favorable situations are more likely to be admitted and promoted than their equivalently skilled peers. The
results suggest that decision-makers take high nominal performance as evidence of high ability and do not discount it by
the ease with which it was achieved. These results clarify our understanding of the correspondence bias using evidence
from both archival studies and experiments with experienced professionals. We discuss implications for both admissions
and personnel selection practices.
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Introduction
The National Association of Colleges and Employers reports
that 66 percent of employers screen candidates by grade point
average (GPA), and 58 percent of employers indicated that a GPA
below 3.0 all but eliminates a candidate’s chances of being hired
[1]. Academic grades, after all, test the mental ability central to
predicting job performance [2]. However, by setting a cutoff GPA
for all candidates, employers implicitly assume that a grade from
one school is equivalent to a grade from another. This is a
problematic assumption because universities vary considerably in
their grading standards; otherwise similar universities display large
differences in the grades they award their students [3–7].
Accounting for variation in grade distributions between institu-
tions represents a special case of a more general problem: how to
make attributions about performance while considering both the
performer’s abilities and the difficulty of the task.
Organizations encounter this vexing attribution problem
routinely. For example, who should be promoted: the marketing
manager who has presided over excellent sales growth for a
cutting-edge product in a hot market segment or the marketing
manager who has produced modest sales growth for a product
near the end of its life cycle in a shrinking market segment? To
what degree is each product’s sales a result of the manager’s
abilities and to what degree is it a consequence of the situation?
Indeed, corporations regularly promote workers with strong
records of achievement into jobs that require new skills only to
see them fail [8–10].
Although decisions like these are common in organizations,
anecdotal evidence suggests that managers are not able to account
sufficiently for situational influences on performance when they
make predictions regarding the likelihood of success of their
employees in a new job [11]. This anecdotal evidence is supported
by psychological research on attribution which suggests that
people have trouble making this type of attribution accurately
[12]. Attributional judgments are predictably impaired by the
correspondence bias [13], a tendency so widespread that Ross [14]
declared it the fundamental attribution error. One way in which
organizations make this error is by assuming that performance in
one domain will predict performance in another domain. Hogarth
and Kolev, for instance, present evidence suggesting that CEOs
who are good at playing golf are paid more. In fact, however, they
actually perform worse in their jobs, perhaps because they are
spending too much time on the golf course [15].
Another way in which organizations fall victim to this bias is
when they rely on dispositional attributions for what are actually
situational effects. It leads managers to explain workers’ perfor-
mance in terms of their inherent abilities despite the undeniable
influence of their social surroundings and institutional constraints
[16,17]. This natural tendency may have contributed to interest in
the search for the individual dispositions that make the best leaders
[18–20], a research approach that is now regarded as misguided
[21]. There is, of course, a parallel literature in the field of
entrepreneurship that sought to identify the traits that predispose
individuals to entrepreneurial success [22,23]. This too is generally
regarded as having been a failure [24,25]. Both research agendas
sought to identify the distinctive personality characteristics that
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alternative approach assumes that success is determined in
powerful ways by social settings and the opportunities they afford
or the constraints they impose on leaders, entrepreneurs, and the
rest of us [26–28].
The correspondence bias
How should organizations assess employee dispositional ability
given noisy performance data that is confounded with situational
difficulty? The answer comes from Kurt Lewin’s [29] attributional
equation: Behavior = f(Disposition, Situation). In other words, an
individual’s performance is a joint function of both the individual’s
disposition (traits, abilities, and predilections) and the situation in
which the individual finds him- or herself. Gilbert [12] proposed
the following simplified specification of Lewin’s attributional
equation: Behavior = Disposition + Situation. Alternatively, if our
goal is to understand the individual’s disposition: Disposition =
Behavior – Situation. Gilbert’s simplification holds when perfor-
mance is the sum of an individual’s ability and task ease. Using this
equation, we can infer an individual’s disposition so long as we can
measure both their performance and how that performance was
affected by the situation. Let us say, for example, that an Olympic
figure skating judge is exactly two tenths of a point more lenient
than the other judges are. Any time the lenient judge is on the
panel, those skaters’ performance received a better evaluation.
Computing the scores that skaters deserved to receive is easy:
simply take two tenths of a point off from the lenient judge’s rating.
The correspondence bias interferes with the simple logic of the
attributional equation by ascribing too little influence to the
situation and too much to the individual’s disposition [21,30]. For
instance, this bias would result in skaters being judged as better
after having been evaluated by lenient judges. There is evidence
that managers do indeed tend to favor dispositional attributions for
employee performance [17,31]. However, these studies cannot
specify whether such attribution represents accuracy or bias
because the research designs did not afford accurate assessments of
the actual causes of performance. The laboratory evidence on the
correspondence bias, for its part, is constrained by a different issue.
Because no participant has objective information on both
performance and situational influences on performance, it may
be unrealistic to expect that anyone will be able to make the
optimal judgment. Indeed, whenever people have better informa-
tion about performance than about the situation, it should be no
surprise that they neglect to consider the situation.
Consider, for example, the classic study by Ross, Amabile, and
Steinmetz [32]. In it, participants were randomly assigned to the
roles of quiz-master, quiz-taker, or observer. Quiz-masters came
up with quiz questions to which they knew the answers. The quiz-
takers, on the other hand, did not know the answers to all of the
questions. Observers, who only observed one quiz-master and one
quiz-taker, faced the difficult task of determining which of the two
was more knowledgeable. On average, observers rated the
randomly assigned quiz-masters as being more knowledgeable,
suggesting that they based their judgments on behavior without
accounting for the impact of the role. But to suggest that observers
should have ignored their observations and simply rated quiz-
master and quiz-taker equally knowledgeable is unrealistic because
it neglects the information present in the quiz game. If the
questions were all easy and the quiz-taker knew the answers to
none of them, then it would not be crazy to infer that this
particular quiz-master was indeed more knowledgeable than this
particular quiz-taker. The fact that the quiz-master and quiz-taker
must be equally knowledgeable, on average (thanks to their
random assignment to roles), is of little help determining whether a
particular quiz-master is more or less knowledgeable than a
particular quiz-taker.
To assess the strength of the situational advantage conferred on
quiz-masters, individual participants would have to know what
percentage of questions the average quiz-taker got right in this
situation. However, because participants in correspondence bias
experiments do not receive the information that would allow them
to assess the strength of the situation, perhaps it should come as no
surprise that the situation is neglected in their attributional
calculus [33,34]. In this paper we offer a new approach in which
participants have excellent information about situational influenc-
es. They are asked to make inferences about a target’s disposition
using information about situation and behavior that is directly
comparable and in equivalent terms. This approach allows us to
advance our understanding of the correspondence bias by
eliminating the concerns of demand and prior beliefs while also
enabling us to calculate the quantitative degree to which they
neglect this information.
Experiments
In this paper we test for the correspondence bias in selection
decisions and ask how easy it might be to correct it. Previous
research has shown that college students facing simulated
admissions tasks in the lab favored applicants from favorable
situations [35]. We present four studies that extend the implica-
tions of prior evidence by showing that attribution errors in
selection decisions affect decisions made by experts, in field
settings, and across domains. In each, we examine situations in
which the difficulty of a prior environment influences candidates’
performance and consequently affects how they are evaluated by
decision-makers. For each study we report how we determined our
sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all conditions, and all
measures in the study. First, we examine the decisions made by
admissions professionals asked to differentiate between academic
excellence and varying grading norms in a controlled experimental
study. Next, we extend the lab paradigm to the business context
and test the decisions made by executives evaluating the
performance of employees in varying business climates. Study 3
addresses alternative explanations which may arise from the
applied contexts in the other studies by testing the hypotheses in
experimental game. Finally, we return to the admissions context to
present the results of an analysis of archival data documenting the
decisions made by graduate business schools.
In each of these studies, decision-makers are faced with the
challenge of evaluating candidates’ aptitude (or disposition) by
observing performance and attempting to account for the varying
situations. We hypothesize that, consistent with the correspon-
dence bias, candidates from favorable situations will be evaluated
more positively and selected more frequently than their counter-
parts with equally commendable dispositions.
To illustrate the analysis that tests this hypothesis, let us consider
an example. Imagine that you are considering promoting one of
two executives. Executive A oversees Division A, with sales of
$100 million. Executive B, on the other hand, oversees Division B,
which has sales of $110 million. Executive A brought Division A
up from $90 million while Executive B presided over Division B’s
increase from $108 to $110 million over the same period of time.
It probably makes more sense to consider each executive’s
performance as a change from previous performance. Every
dollar in sales that the divisions were already making before the
executives showed up should reduce the amount of credit they
receive for sales accrued during their tenure. We expect, then, that
nominal performance will matter. It should, however, be
Attribution Errors in Performance Evaluation
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discounting should be roughly equal in size but opposite in sign.
An assessment of the two executives should heavily weight the
change in sales each has achieved, and should almost completely
discount the total sales each wound up delivering.
Study 1 – Admissions Professionals in the Lab
We put experienced admissions professionals into a fictional
version of their professional roles of evaluating applicants and
deciding whether to admit them. To test whether the candidate’s
success in the admissions process was predicted by the grading
norms of their alma maters, we gave participants a simplified
admissions decision task with two main pieces of information on
each of nine candidates: their GPAs and the distribution from
which each GPA came. Each factor was manipulated in three
levels, creating a 3 (GPA above average, average, or below
average) 63 (Average GPA at alma mater: high, medium, or low)
full factorial design within subjects. Average GPAs were
operationalized as 3.6 (high), 3.0 (medium), or 2.4 (low) to
generally correspond to the range of grading norms observed in
U.S. undergraduate institutions. Performance relative to these
means was operationalized as candidate GPAs that were equal to
the average, 0.3 points above it, or 0.3 points below it. Because this
design creates artificially round numbers, each figure in the stimuli
was randomly adjusted to within 60.02 of the specified value.
Participants knew that the nine fictional institutions from which
the nine applicants came did not differ in quality or selectivity.
Grading norms at the different institutions were therefore
uninformative with respect to student quality. We predicted that
our expert participants would rightly reward candidates with
above-average GPAs with more positive evaluations and higher
probability of admission. The more interesting hypothesis is that
there would also be a positive main effect of average GPA despite
the irrelevance of this factor to the underlying aptitude of the
applicant. This hypothesized effect would be consistent with a
judgment process that neglects to discount GPAs sufficiently in
light of the ease with which they are achieved.
Method. The Carnegie Mellon University institutional review
board reviewed and approved the study design, materials,
compensation, and recruitment technique. Participants completed
written documentation of informed consent before participating.
Participants were all 23 responding members of the staff of the
undergraduate admissions office at a selective university in the
United States. Participants were recruited by e-mail to a website
through which the entire study was conducted. As compensation,
participants were entered into a lottery in which they stood a 1 in
10 chance to win $100. Of the participants, 61 percent were male,
the average age was 34 years, and the mean professional
experience in college admissions was over 5 years.
Participants read the following instructions:
‘‘In this exercise, you will be playing the role of a member of the
admissions committee at a selective MBA program. You are selecting
students who would like to obtain masters degrees in business
administration. Your most important goal is to select the best candidates
from among the applicants. In general, you usually have space to admit
about half the applicants.
You will see the applications of nine hypothetical students. The set of
applicants that you will review all graduated from colleges of similar
quality and selectivity. Please review each applicant carefully in order to
assess the quality of their prior academic performance in college. Please
review one candidate at a time. Answer the questions about each
candidate before turning the page to read about the next candidate.’’
Participants received one page of information about each
candidate from which to make their judgments. The information
presented for each candidate included the candidate’s GPA and
the average GPA at their alma mater. To emphasize the
candidates’ performance relative to their peers, the difference
between their GPA and the average was presented in the
statement, ‘‘Candidate 1’s GPA is [above/below] the college
average by [difference].’’
To add richness to the stimuli, participants also read a short
transcript of ten recently completed classes. For each of the classes,
the candidate’s grade was listed along with the average grade given
in that class. Grades were generated for each class such that the
mean of the candidate’s grades were equal to their GPA and the
mean of the average grades was equal to the college’s average
GPA. The individual class grades for each candidate were
generated such that the variance was constant across candidates.
The names of the fictional colleges and the names of the courses
were randomized to avoid creating any confounds. Candidates
were presented to each participant in a randomly determined
order, which was then rotated across participants in a Latin-
squares design.
Participants made two judgments concerning each candidate:
how successful the candidate had been in college on a 7-point scale
from 1(‘‘very unsuccessful’’)t o7( ‘‘very successful’’), and how likely they
would be to admit them (as a probability between 0% and 100%).
After reviewing and evaluating each candidate individually,
participants were asked to select four of the nine candidates for
admission. Participants were permitted to review summary
information for each candidate as they made their admissions
decisions.
After participants finished the experimental portion of the study,
they completed a small number of questions assessing their beliefs
about how grades should be interpreted in the admissions process.
They also told us their ages, years of experience, and job titles.
Results. Although each participant produced three responses
for each candidate, the results are virtually identical across
measures (see Table 1). Accordingly, the three measures were
standardized and averaged to create a single measure of the
evaluation of each candidate (alpha reliability =82).
This aggregate measure was then subject to a 3 (GPA) 63
(average GPA at undergrad institution) within-subjects ANOVA.
As expected, the results show a strong main effect of GPA,
F(2,44)=85.09, p,0.001, gp
2= 0.80. Those candidates with
GPAs above their local averages were much more likely to be
admitted (70%) than those with below-average GPAs (12%).
Counter to normative expectations, but consistent with our
hypothesis, the average GPA at the candidate’s home institution
also drove a significant main effect, and even explained as much of
the variance in evaluations, F(2, 44)=94.24, p,0.001, gp
2=0.81.
This main effect suggests that it is just as advantageous to come
from a school with high average grades as it is to be above average.
Indeed, the effect on the probability of admission is very similar
(see Table 2). Candidates from the schools with lower grading
norms were admitted 12% of the time while those from the schools
with higher average grades were admitted 72% of the time. Note
that these differences exist despite the same distribution of
performance among applicants from each ‘‘type’’ of school.
The interaction between GPA and Average GPA was also
statistically significant, but does not explain as much variance in
evaluations as the main effects, F(4, 88)=5.88, p,0.001,
gp
2=0.21. This interaction describes the fact that a better-than-
average GPA had its smallest benefit for those who came from
institutions with tough grading and low average grades (see
Table 2).
Attribution Errors in Performance Evaluation
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on the use of GPA statistics in real admissions decision making.
We asked, ‘‘For approximately what percentage of candidates is
information about their home institution’s average GPA avail-
able?’’ Although our experiment afforded decision makers access
to full information about the candidates’ individual performance
as well as the situational influences in their environment, we
suspected such data was less readily available in the real world.
Indeed, this sample of professional admissions staffers estimated
that average grade information was available in only 61.5% of
cases. This suggests that the magnitude of the bias measured here
is likely to be conservative relative to a naturalistic process, because
we provided them with more complete information than they
actually have in their jobs.
In response to the question, ‘‘When considering information
about a candidate, how important is the average GPA at a
candidate’s home institution compared to their individual GPA?,’’
the mean response (3.8) was closest to the midpoint ‘‘Equally
important as the candidate’s GPA’’ of the scale which ranged from
‘‘Only the average GPA is important’’ to ‘‘Only the candidate’s
GPA is important.’’ This is consistent with what we believe to be
the normative decision rule, because the individual’s nominal
performance and the ease of the situation ought to receive equal
and opposite weighting when making dispositional inferences.
Discussion. The results of these hypothetical admissions
decisions made by experienced professionals suggest that candi-
dates who happen to graduate from schools with higher grading
norms may actually have a better chance of being accepted to
college or graduate school. This is true independent of their
personal performance in that situation. For example, high-
performing applicants from low-GPA schools were given lower
ratings than under-performing applicants from high GPA schools.
This should be cause for concern among stakeholders at
institutions with tougher grading norms. The high standards to
which the students at these institutions are held may be mistaken
for poor performance.
Despite the presence of unambiguous information on the key
terms in Lewin’s attributional equation, our expert participants in
Study 1 were either unwilling or unable to make admissions
judgments solely based on applicants’ dispositions. The participants
may have inferred variation in school quality from the variation in
average grades – knowing that this relationship is true to some
extent in the real world. We should point out however, that one of
the few instructions for the task explicitly described the applicant’s
alma maters as being of similar quality. Participants may have
inferred variation where they were told there was none, but this is
notthemostparsimoniousexplanationoftheratherdramaticeffects
we observe. Instead, we argue that the results demonstrate the
difficulty people – even experts – have discounting nominal
performances in light of situational influences.
Study 2 – Executives and Promotion Decisions
The decisions made by admissions professionals were consistent
with our hypotheses, but we have no reason to believe that these
effects are isolated to university admissions. To demonstrate that
the effect is not driven by idiosyncratic properties of the admissions
domain, we constructed an analogous decision task in the
corporate domain. Study 2 seeks to investigate the effect of
varying situational difficulty on the evaluation of employees for
promotion. Participants, all of whom were working professionals
with years of experience with selection and promotion decisions,
were asked to evaluate twelve candidates who were up for
promotion to a senior management position. We varied the
difficulty of the situation and the individual performance of the
candidates to examine how the situation affected the dispositional
evaluations made by our participants. We hypothesized that
managers would favor candidates benefiting from the positive light
of easy business situations just as admissions had done for
candidates from environments with high average grades.
Method. The Carnegie Mellon University institutional review
board reviewed and approved the study design, materials, and
appropriateness as a class exercise. The IRB granted exemption
from documented informed consent as the study involved only
minimal risk and participation took place in the context of normal
class exercises. Students were not required to participate.
Participants were 129 executive education students (38%
female) at a research university in the western United States
participating as part of a class exercise. They had on average, 18.0
(SD=8.6) years of work experience and been involved with an
average of 14.2 (SD=29.6) promotion decisions.
The experiment employed a 2 (situation: easy vs. difficult) 63
(individual performance: low, medium and high) within-subjects
design with two candidates in each cell, resulting in twelve
candidates for our participants to evaluate.
Participants evaluated each of the twelve candidates, rating their
performance and their suitability for promotion. Participants read
Table 1. Summary of ANOVA results by dependent variable and factor (Study 1).
Situation (Avg. GPA) Performance (GPA) Avg GPA * GPA
F (2, 44) p p
2 F (2, 44) p p
2 F (4, 88) p p
2
Success 61.75 ,001 0.74 48.02 ,001 0.69 3.42 0.012 0.13
Prob. of Accept 58.97 ,001 0.79 52.79 ,001 0.76 7.74 ,001 0.62
Admission 42.43 ,001 0.66 52.79 ,001 0.76 3.42 ,001 0.23
Mean Z-score 94.24 ,001 0.81 85.09 ,001 0.80 5.88 ,001 0.21
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.t001
Table 2. Probability of being accepted by condition (Study 1).
GPA (Performance)
Avg.–0.3 Avg. Avg. +0.3 Total
Average GPA
(Situation)
Low (2.4) 00 09 26 12
Med (3.0) 04 57 87 49
High (3.6) 30 91 96 72
Total 12 52 70
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.t002
Attribution Errors in Performance Evaluation
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deciding whom to promote to a senior management position from
a set of twelve candidates. The most important measure of their
performance is the percentage of flights that leave on time from
each of their airports. Moreover, of the twelve airports managed
by the candidates, there were two types of airports: Half were
historically quite punctual and half that ran late more often.
Task difficulty was manipulated via the historical on-time
percentage of flights at each airport. Hard airports had 70% of
flights on time; easy airports had 85% on-time flights. Individual
performance was manipulated relative to this situational effect: low
performance was 5% below the average, medium performance
was at the average and high performance was 5% above the
average. We varied these artificially round numbers by a few
tenths of a percentage point to increase the realism of the scenario.
To ensure that candidates were being evaluated solely based on
their on-time performance and not by airport, we counter-
balanced each of the possible match-ups between airport and
performance and randomized the order in which participants
encountered the candidates.
For each candidate, participants were shown the airport’s
historical on-time performance across ten years: five years
preceding the candidate’s tenure and the most recent five years
under their management. The five-year average on-time percent-
age was presented with each block of data. Participants answered
two questions about each candidate: (a) Performance: ‘‘Please rate
the performance of Candidate Name, the manager in charge of operations at this
airport.’’ on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 (Very Bad) and 7 (Very
Good), and (b) Promotion Worthiness: ‘‘Is Candidate Name worthy of
promotion?’’ on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 (Definitely No) and 7
(Definitely Yes).
Results. Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the
dependent measures, Performance and Promotion Worthiness.W e
averaged the ratings given to the two candidates in each cell for
the two measures and submitted them each to a 2 (difficulty) 63
(performance) repeated-measures ANOVA.
The results for the performance rating revealed a significant
within-subjects effect of both situational difficulty,
F(1,128)=80.40, p,001, gp
2=39 and actual performance, F(2,
256)=301.92, p,001, gp
2=70 on the candidates’ performance
ratings. The interaction between our two main effects, difficulty6
performance, was not significant, F(2, 256)=0.692, p.05,
indicating that while our participants gave higher ratings to
candidates from easy airports, they were consistent in their ratings
within each difficulty category.The results for the promotion
worthiness rating followed a similar pattern, with significant
within-subjects effects for both difficulty, F(1, 128)=73.71, p,001,
gp
2=37, and performance, F(2, 256)=248.539, p,001, gp
2=66,
and a non-significant interaction of difficulty 6performance, F(2,
256)=0.480, p.05.
Discussion. If our participants had not been affected by the
correspondence bias, then candidates working at easier airports
should not have been awarded higher ratings than their
dispositional peers working at more difficult airports. However,
what we find is that those who are fortunate enough to be assigned
to easy airports are evaluated significantly more positively. We can
make strong conclusions with respect to the normative status of
participants’ decisions, thanks to the control of the experimental
paradigm. The experienced professionals who served as partici-
pants in the first two studies made consistent errors in deciding
whom to admit or promote. They favored those from easy
situations, rewarding the fortunate and punishing the unfortunate.
However, legitimate questions remain regarding the degree to
which they actually make these same errors in their work. One
might be tempted to predict that the effects we observe in the first
two studies would be even more dramatic in professional domains
that do not afford such clear information about the size of
situational effects. On the other hand, it may be that organizations
can provide some correctives for individual biases [36]. Hypo-
thetical decisions in an experiment could be limited in their
validity as a model of fully consequential and incentivized decision
making. We seek to address these limitations by demonstrating
convergent evidence in a sample of analogous decisions made in
the field.
Study 3 – Selecting Contestants
To address lingering concerns about potential explanations for
the effect we observe, Study 3 sought to rule out alternative
explanations having to do with what performance means in
different conditions. For instance lenient-grading universities may
actually be better, or attract better students, in some ways that we
have been unable to measure or identify. Or it may be the case
that increasing the on-time performance from 85% is more
impressive than increasing it from 70%. To rule out these and
related concerns, this study had participants make selection
decisions in a context where nominal performance differed
because some candidates were graded leniently and some were
graded stringently. Crucially, grading leniency was randomly
determined and was entirely transparent. Participants’ task was to
review the performance of a set of contestants in a weight-guessing
game and then to select those contestants who they thought would
perform best on a subsequent game of the same type.
Method. The University of California at Berkeley institution-
al review board reviewed and approved the study design,
materials, compensation, and recruitment technique. Participants
Table 3. Ratings of performance and promotion worthiness based on candidate performance and airport difficulty (Study 2).
Situation (Historic on-time
%) Easy < 85% Difficult < 70%
Performance Low Medium High Low Medium High
(Relative on-time %) (5% below) (average) (5% above) (5% below) (average) (5% above)
Performance Rating 3.54 4.79 6.14 3.09 4.25 5.55
(1.10) (0.85) (0.91) (1.03) (0.80) (0.94)
Promotion Worthiness Rating 3.18 4.30 5.84 2.71 3.76 5.19
(1.23) (1.07) (0.96) (1.16) (1.10) (1.08)
Average ratings of the candidates appear in each cell. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.t003
Attribution Errors in Performance Evaluation
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participating.
We opened the survey to 200 participants via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk web site and paid each person $.50 each to
complete an online survey that required an average of 7.5 minutes
to complete. The sample size of 200 was chosen based on estimates
of yield and effect sizes. First, participants completed an attention
check. Next, to provide participants with a direct experience of
task difficulty, these individuals saw five photographs of different
people, guessed how much each person weighed and then received
feedback in the form of the person’s actual weight. Next, they
reviewed the performance of six putative contestants who had
previously played two rounds of the game with different pictures.
The task of participants was to review the contestants’ perfor-
mance in round 1 and select who they thought would perform best
in round 2. Participants saw each contestant’s actual guess along
with the actual weights for each of the ten photos in the first round.
Answers close enough to the actual weight were designated correct
according to their grading standard and appeared highlighted in
green. Answers outside this range, which were nominally
incorrect, appeared highlighted in red.
Participants were motivated to choose those who were best at
weight-guessing because they earned one lottery ticket (toward a
$50 prize) each time one of their three chosen contestants
answered a question correctly in the second round of the game.
The second round of the game consisted of ten pictures, and
answers were counted as correct when the guess was within 10
pounds of the person’s actual weight.
The experimental manipulation varied how contestants’
performance in round 1 was scored. Participants read, ‘‘We
randomly selected three of the six contestants and held them to a
high standard of accuracy: their answers only counted as right if
they got within 4 pounds of the truth. For the other half, their
answers counted as right if they got within 30 pounds of the truth.’’
For half of participants, contestants 3, 5, and 6 were held to a high
standard. For the other half of participants, contestants 1, 2, and 4
were held to a high standard.
Results. We dropped participants from the analysis who
failed an attention check and who failed to select three contestants
on whom to bet, resulting in 156 participants. Our experimental
manipulation significantly affected participants’ choices, chi-
square(1)=68.77, p,.001. 82% of our participants selected more
leniently-graded contestants than stringently-graded contestants,
and 81% of the contestants they chose were from those graded
leniently. One alternative was that participants selected the three
contestants who performed best. The three contestants whose
weight estimates generated the lowest mean absolute deviation
from the correct answers received, on average, 3.67 out of 10 right
in the second round. By comparison, our participants selected
contestants who received 3.56 (SD=21) right, and this difference is
significantly worse, t(155)=25.80, p,001.
Discussion. Because participants received full information
about contestants’ performance, grading criteria, and the arbitrary
determination of grading criteria, few alternative explanations for
participants’ preferences are plausible. Instead, they appear to
have responded superficially to the number of items that were
counted as correct. Arguably, with sufficient time and motivation,
people could have actually assessed contestants’ performance
themselves and the biasing effect of our experimental manipula-
tion would be reduced or eliminated. We do not, however, claim
that the correspondence bias affects every decision, no matter how
large and important. If the correspondence bias represents a
heuristic or ‘‘default’’ decision mode, that is more than sufficient to
produce powerful and pervasive effects on human judgment.
Study 4 – Actual Admissions Decisions
Studies 1 through 3 demonstrate the difficulty of properly
incorporating information about the difficulty of the situation
when evaluating performance, at least in the scenarios we created.
Of course, even with a sample of professionals one can ask whether
the motivation and consequences of real decisions can be emulated
in a laboratory design. Moreover, the effect we observe in carefully
controlled experimental settings may shrink to insignificance
relative to all the other influences in the complexity of real
admissions decisions. We move to an archival sample of actual
admissions decisions for a final test our hypotheses in the field
context.
Method. The Carnegie Mellon University institutional review
board reviewed and approved the study design as an archival
research project without identifiable participants.
We obtained admissions data from four selective (admission
rates between 16% and 39%) MBA programs in the United States.
These data include each applicant’s undergraduate GPA and alma
mater, as well as a number of useful control variables such as age,
gender, race, national citizenship, years of work experience,
standardized test scores (in this case, the GMAT test), and
interview performance. Each school provided multi-year data
ranging from three to eleven years of coverage and drawing from
years between 1999 and 2009. Annual applicant totals per school
varied from 1,236 to 3,742, yielding between 5,700 and 20,100
applicants per school across all available years, and a total dataset
of 56,796 applicants. Of this set 24,994 were graduates of foreign
undergraduate institutions and are excluded from the analyses due
to incompatible grading systems.
We collected additional data describing the undergraduate
institutions (i.e. school quality, average GPA) from which the
applicants had graduated. We began with two measures of school
quality. The first, Jack Gourman’s ratings of undergraduate
institutions is an academically cited continuous measure of the
quality of education provided for nearly every U.S. institution
[37]. As an additional measure of quality, we used the US News &
World Report annual ranking of the US colleges and universities
[38]. Although the US News measure of quality is not
academically reviewed and does not offer complete transparency
in its methodology, it captures some dimensions of school quality –
such as perceived prestige and alumni success – that may be
important in our model. Perceptions of institution quality may
actually be more direct drivers of admissions decisions than the
underlying quality Gourman strives to capture As a final, more
objective measure of school quality we used the average GMAT
score of entering students.
We attempted to collect data on average grades for all
institutions represented in our sample of applicants. The data on
average grades we collected came from a variety of sources. The
largest single source was a publicly available database of average
GPAs assembled for the purpose of documenting trends in grade
inflation [6], but this source was not comprehensive. The
remaining institutions for which we lacked average grade
information were contacted directly by email or telephone, as
necessary. Many declined to provide us with information about
average grades. In the end, we were able to obtain average GPA
data from 198 institutions, corresponding to 20,913 applicants or
77% of the domestic applicants in our sample. Average GPA of the
applicants’ undergraduate institution was the most restrictive
variable in our dataset, with the other predictors ranging from
85%–100% complete.
Applicants’ performance was measured by their deviation from
the average GPA at their undergraduate institution, henceforth:
relative GPA. By modeling performance as the difference between
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hypothesis that applicants’ situations affect their outcomes above
and beyond their unique performances in that situation. Relative
GPA is a standard unit of performance that can be used to
compare the disposition of students across situations. Using
relative GPA as our measure of performance solves two problems
with model interpretation. First, including both GPA and average
GPA in a model complicates their interpretation since average
GPA (together with the student’s performance) is a component of
one’s nominal GPA. Second, using relative GPA also avoids
problems with logistic regression assumptions because the
distribution of nominal GPAs is truncated at 4.0 while relative
GPA is normally distributed. Note that this calculation of relative
GPA is simply a transformation of known values, not a comparison
between scale measurements. As such, it is not threatened by the
reliability concerns inherent in difference scores [39,40].
Interview ratings were standardized within each application
year at each admitting school to account for different systems of
evaluation. Average GPA at a candidate’s undergraduate institu-
tion was mean centered before being included in the model. Racial
identifications are presented as comparisons to the baseline
category of Caucasian, which was the largest group in the sample.
Results. The means, standard deviations, and bivariate
correlations between applicant level variables are shown in
Table 4, while Table 5 reports the same statistics for school level
variables. As shown in Table 4, there is, not surprisingly, a positive
relationship between applicants’ undergraduate grades and
admission decisions: Those who were admitted had higher GPAs
(M=3.35) than those who were not (M=3.29), t (36384)=13.12,
p,001. The positive effect of institutional GPAs may be because
better universities have higher average grades. Indeed, average
grades tend to be positively related to institution quality with
correlations between average GPA and other measures of quality
ranging from r=18 for the Gourman ratings to r=62 for the US
News ratings. Average absolute GPA may in fact be correlated
with student ability. A more complete picture, then, is provided by
a full multiple regression.
To examine which factors predict admission, we conducted a
series of ordinal logistic regressions, modeling the outcomes of
being waitlisted and accepted as ordered improvements over the
reference group of rejected applicants. Table 6 summarizes these
models, showing how the average GPA and applicants’ relative
GPA influence admissions outcomes. In each of these models, we
hypothesize that applicants’ relative GPAs will be positively
associated with admission indicating that above average perfor-
mances are rewarded, but that the average GPA at the applicant’s
alma mater will also be positive and significantly related to
admission. This would represent an error, because, holding all else
equal, graduate schools should not want to reward candidates
solely for graduating from institutions with more lenient grading
norms.
Models 1 through 3 build an increasingly complex model of
admissions decisions starting with only our central variables of
interest, and then adding the relevant academic and demographic
terms. In all three models, relative GPA is positive and significant,
indicating that individual performance is rewarded by increased
rates of acceptance. Average GPA is significant and positive as
hypothesized in model 1, but this simple model explains a very
small amount of the variance in admissions outcomes. In model 3,
the Average GPA term is not significant. This is likely because
models 1 through 3 do not control for the differences in
application year and admitting school. Admission rates vary
dramatically across these situations, from 16% to 39% by school,
and from 20% to 33% by application year. Subsequent models
address this shortcoming.
Models 4 and 5 introduce dummy variables for the four
admitting schools and eleven years in which admission decisions
were made, while model 6 uses both factors to control for the
significant variation in baseline acceptance rates. Model 6 shows
that both a candidate’s relative GPA and the average GPA at their
alma mater have a significant positive effect on their likelihood of
acceptance.
Model 7 replicates the findings of model 6 but drops the
candidate’s interview scores from the equation. After including all
of the control variables available in our dataset, the interview score
restricts our sample size more than any other control. Dropping it
in model 7 allows us to double our sample size and maintain a
representative sample through more restrictive analyses. Compar-
ing model 7 to model 6 reveals no qualitative changes in any of the
predictors although the relative influence of average GPA
increases compared to relative GPA. Further models discussed
will generally be adaptations of model 7.
Table 7 presents models 8 through 11, which demonstrate the
robustness of our results to three different measures of applicant’s
undergraduate school quality: US News ratings, Gourman [37]
ratings, and the average entrance SAT scores of matriculating
students. To compare the relative influence of these three
predictors, each was standardized. The relationship between
school quality and applicant’s admission is critical to the
interpretation of our results because of the correlation between
quality and average GPA. It is tempting to consider whether the
large positive effect of average GPA is related to the fact that many
of those students benefiting are from good schools with high
grading norms. Models 8–11 show that no matter how school
quality is measured, average GPA has a distinct and positive
impact on candidate outcomes.
In each of the other models presented, only the US News ratings
are included as the measure of school quality for two reasons. First,
of the three measures, US News ratings are most closely related to
the public reputation of the schools. We expect that a school’s
reputation influences the evaluation of their alumni more than the
less visible educational values captured by the other measures. The
data support these inferences. While each of the quality predictors
are significant when included alone, model 11 shows that effect of
school quality as measured by the US News ratings are more stable
in both significance and magnitude.
Table 8 presents three new models to address alternative
analysis approaches and concerns. Model 7 is presented again for
ease of comparison. Model 12 includes an interaction between the
two primary predictors, relative and average GPA. The interaction
is significant and positive, but it does not affect the results from the
main effect which remain positive, significant, and of similar
magnitude. The positive coefficient on the interaction term means
that the effect of average grades on the probability of admission is
larger for above-average candidates than those performing below
their local average as illustrated in Figure 1.
Model 13 tests the analysis with a subset of the sample of
applicants. Although we maintain that it is normatively ideal for
admissions decision makers to discount applicants’ nominal GPAs
to account for variation in grading norms, this may be difficult to
do in practice. It was quite difficult for us to obtain average GPA
data from the wide selection of undergraduate institutions
represented in our sample of applicants. Our sample of
professional admissions workers from Study 1 indicated that they
had some information about grading norms for nearly two thirds
of applicants. Because it is likely that admissions staffers are more
familiar with the top undergraduate institutions, we restricted the
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schools in the top quartile of US News ratings. This decreased the
sample by only 35% compared to the model 7 because so many
applicants in the sample graduated from these top institutions. The
model shows that the applicant’s GPA continues to be significant
and positive, but that even in this top quartile, average GPA is
robustly significant and positive. In fact, in this subset, the
magnitude of the effect of average GPA is slightly larger than that
of the candidate’s relative performance. All else equal, applicants
who are a tenth of a point above average at their school are no
more likely to be accepted than applicants that had average GPAs
at a school where the grading norms were a tenth of a point higher
than other schools.
Finally, in model 15 we ensure that our conclusions are robust
to an analysis without our computed relative GPA measure. In this
model, normative admissions decisions would discount situational
influences by weighting average GPA negatively and to a similar
degree that nominal GPA is positive. We see that average GPA is
not significantly different than zero, consistent with the conclusion
that decision makers are not adjusting nominal performance in
light of information about the situation.
Discussion. We argue that the tendency for admissions
decisions to ignore grading leniency is explainable by attributional
processes that take performance at face value and fail to discount it
by situational influences. The result is that applicants from schools
with lenient grading are evaluated more positively simply because
their GPAs are higher. Model 8 shows that applicants benefitting
from an average GPA one standard deviation above the mean (just
0.17 points) are 31% more likely to move up from denied to
waitlisted or from waitlisted to accepted. Figure 1 illustrates the
magnitude of this effect.
However, the field data do not allow us to rule out two viable
alternative explanations for our results. First, it might not be fair to
assume that admissions staffs have perfect information about
average grades at all other academic institutions. After all, these
data were costly for us to collect. Without the data, it would be
difficult for admissions departments to use the information to
discount grades appropriately, and they would simply have to rely
on absolute GPAs as useful (if imperfect) measures of academic
performance. On the other hand, this information is critical to
their ability to interpret applicants’ GPAs, and admissions offices
are likely to have better ways of obtaining these data than did we.
A failure to demand it, in and of itself, suggests a failure to
appreciate its value.
Second, it is possible that average grades capture something
important about the undergraduate institution. Although we
considered the roles of institution quality, public/private status,
tuition, and student quality as control variables, it is possible that
lenient grading may covary with other important features of
institutions that are not captured in our control variables. The
experimental data from the first study can help us to address this
concern to some degree. Professional admissions workers evalu-
ated candidates from various fictional schools whose grading
leniency varied substantially but that were equal in quality and
selectivity. This makes it unlikely that our participants favored
candidates from lenient-grading institutions because they believed
that the students were actually better at lenient-grading institu-
tions.
Tabe 4. Applicant level descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (Study 3); all correlations are statistically significant (p,001).
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Male 0.72 0.45
2. Age 29.8 4.56 15
3. US Citizen 0.53 0.50 207 207
4. GMAT 669 65.4 14 216 208
5. Interview rating 0.00 0.96 205 05 05 05
6. Years of work history 5.35 3.16 08 39 209 05 07
7. Undergraduate GPA 3.30 0.39 215 221 03 16 04 213
8. Admitted 0.31 0.46 204 03 16 17 38 202 14
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.t004
Table 5. Undergraduate institution level descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations (Study 3); all correlations are statistically
significant (p,.05) unless marked (*).
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Gourman quality score 3.5 0.6
2. US News quality score 61.7 16.1 31
3. Average entrance SAT 1153 144 51 81
4. Average GPA 3.2 0.2 18 62 51
5. Tuition 18450 9686 12 66 63 51
6. University 0.6 0.5 38 221 218 217 02*
7. Private 0.5 0.5 213 48 40 50 82 214
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.t005
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Many studies in the social psychology and organizational
behavior literatures have found that people tend to attribute too
much influence to disposition and too little influence to situational
factors impinging on the actor when explaining others’ behaviors,
achievements, and failures. This common tendency, labeled the
correspondence bias or the fundamental attribution error, has
been shown to be robust across a variety of contexts and situations.
Yet, to date, most of the evidence about this bias comes from
laboratory experiments with college students as participants, and
its implications for field settings and organizational outcomes are
seldom examined. Using data from both the experimental
laboratory and the field, we extend prior research by investigating
whether this tendency leads experienced professionals to make
systematic mistakes in their selection decisions, favoring alumni
from academic institutions with higher grade distributions and
employees working in favorable business climates. Our results
indicate that candidates who have demonstrated high performance
thanks to favorable situations are more likely to be rated highly
and selected. Across all our studies, the results suggest that experts
take high performance as evidence of high ability and do not
Table 6. Summary of ordinal logistic models predicting candidates’ admission outcomes (Study 3).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Deny | Waitlist 0.571*** 6.860*** 8.500*** 10.359*** 7.897*** 8.305*** 9.173***
(0.016) (0.045) (0.022) (0.037) (0.026) (0.050) (0.024)
Waitlist | Accept 0.840*** 7.370*** 9.027*** 10.913*** 8.448*** 8.884*** 9.544***
(0.016) (0.049) (0.028) (0.042) (0.032) (0.055) (0.027)
Performance: Relative GPA 0.868*** 0.771*** 0.733*** 0.798*** 0.972*** 1.057*** 1.562***
(0.042) (0.068) (0.073) (0.075) (0.078) (0.081) (0.058)
Situation: Average GPA 1.389*** 0.359* 0.250 0.323 0.736*** 0.878*** 1.597***
(0.097) (0.179) (0.197) (0.203) (0.203) (0.208) (0.154)
Interview 1.012*** 1.021*** 1.077*** 1.025*** 1.080***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Years of work experience 20.002 20.004 20.075*** 0.029** 0.026 0.123***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012)
GMAT 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School Quality: US News
Rating
0.015*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.003 0.035*** 0.006 20.024* 20.061***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Gender: Male 20.614*** 20.648*** 20.696*** 20.714*** 20.560***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.041)
Citizenship: US 0.213* 0.241* 0.248* 0.240* 0.086
(0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.104) (0.074)
Race: African American 1.266*** 1.406*** 1.496*** 1.643*** 1.547***
(0.144) (0.151) (0.148) (0.154) (0.107)
Race: Asian 20.154* 20.174* 20.205** 20.214** 20.191***
(0.068) (0.070) (0.070) (0.072) (0.050)
Race: Hispanic 1.229*** 1.280*** 1.374*** 1.422*** 0.943***
(0.152) (0.158) (0.155) (0.162) (0.101)
Race: American Indian 0.523*** 0.474*** 0.640*** 0.655*** 0.648***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Race: Other 20.121 20.143* 20.126 20.122 20.146**
(0.070) (0.073) (0.072) (0.075) (0.055)
Application Years Included Included Included
Admitting School Included Included Included
N 19503 8681 8674 8674 8674 8674 17504
AIC 31774 13323 13032 12598 12627 12208 22235
*p,05; ** p,01; *** p,001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.t006
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was achieved. High grades are easier to achieve in an environment
where the average is high and so are less indicative of high
performance than are the same grades that were earned from an
institution with lower grades on average. Sky-high on-time
percentages should be less impressive at an airport that was
running well before the manager got there. Although we focused
on two selection scenarios, we believe the results speak to other
selection and evaluation problems.
Indeed, we see consistent evidence of situation neglect in
contexts where political and business leaders are credited with
performance that derives directly from stochastic economic
factors. Voters face a Lewinian dilemma when they evaluate the
performance of incumbent politicians running for re-election.
Table 7. Summary of ordinal logistic models of graduate school admissions, comparing standardized measures of applicants’
undergraduate institution quality (Study 3).
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Deny | Waitlist 7.847*** 8.050*** 7.829*** 7.656***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Waitlist | Accept 8.218*** 8.419*** 8.201*** 8.026***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Performance: Relative GPA 1.562*** 1.419*** 1.529*** 1.584***
(0.059) (0.055) (0.057) (0.060)
Situation: Average GPA 1.597*** 2.274*** 1.627*** 1.556***
(0.156) (0.130) (0.143) (0.158)
Years of work experience 0.123*** 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.126***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
GMAT 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016***









Standardized School Quality: SAT 0.280*** 0.085*
(0.026) (0.039)
Age 20.061*** 20.072*** 20.064*** 20.064***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Gender: Male 20.560*** 20.605*** 20.554*** 20.543***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042)
Citizenship: US 0.086 0.133 0.090 0.044
(0.074) (0.071) (0.072) (0.074)
Race: African American 1.547*** 1.605*** 1.577*** 1.500***
(0.107) (0.103) (0.105) (0.111)
Race: Asian 20.191*** 20.204*** 20.212*** 20.181***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051)
Race: Hispanic 0.943*** 0.965*** 0.921*** 0.936***
(0.101) (0.098) (0.099) (0.102)
Race: American Indian 0.648*** 0.802*** 0.726*** 0.565***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Race: Other 20.146** 20.145** 20.156** 20.153**
(0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056)
Application Years Included Included Included Included
Admitting School Included Included Included Included
N 17504 18441 18121 16926
AIC 22235 23632 23123 21507
*p,05; ** p,01; *** p,001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.t007
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their constituencies while considering what portion of those
changes were due to lucky or exogenous factors. Wolfers [41]
finds that voters, like our admissions professionals and executives,
favor politicians that had the good luck to work under favorable
conditions. Voters are more likely to reelect incumbents after
terms marked by positive national economic trends or (in the case
of oil-rich states) high oil prices. CEOs also benefit from fortuitous
economic conditions for which they are not responsible. Bertrand
and Mullainathan [42] present evidence that CEO compensation
is driven to equal degrees by their management and the
uncontrollable economic conditions in which they managed.
Stakeholders in these cases have strong incentives to reward
leaders who add value above the vagaries of the economy, but they
seem blind to the difference.
It is often the case that structural and situational factors are the
most powerful influences on behavior. Within organizations, for
example, it is easier to succeed in some jobs than in others [43].
Sometimes people will achieve positive outcomes simply because
of a beneficent environment. It is easier to achieve success as a
manager when your team is strong than when your team is weak.
Likewise, it is easier to obtain a strong education in an excellent
private school than in an under-funded public school. And it is
easier to achieve high grades at schools where higher grades are
the norm. So it would be a mistake to neglect situational effects on
performance, but that is what our data suggest that even experts
and professionals tend to do.
Are we always doomed to make erroneous correspondent
inferences? Evidence suggests not; the bias is subject to a number
of moderating factors. These are useful to consider both because
they provide clues about the psychological mechanisms at work
and because they suggest potential debiasing treatments. For
instance, when people are stressed, distracted, or busy, they are
more likely to fall victim to the correspondence bias [44]. Those
with greater capacity for reflective thought, as measured by need
for cognition, are less likely to show the bias [45]. When people
feel accountable to others, they are less likely to show the bias [46].
When people are in good moods, they appear more likely show the
Figure 1. Model 7 predicted probability of acceptance by
situation and performance (Study 3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.g001
Table 8. Summary of alternative analysis approaches (Study
3).
Model 7 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Deny | Waitlist 9.173*** 9.155*** 8.333*** 14.244***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.040) (0.016)
Waitlist | Accept 9.544*** 9.527*** 8.691*** 14.616***











1.597*** 1.397*** 1.715*** 0.035







0.123*** 0.125*** 0.130*** 0.123***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
GMAT 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School Quality:
US News Rating
0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Age 20.061*** 20.062*** 20.081*** 20.061***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
Gender: Male 20.560*** 20.556*** 20.511*** 20.560***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.049) (0.042)
Citizenship: US 0.086 0.078 20.154 0.086
(0.074) (0.074) (0.092) (0.074)
Race: African
American
1.547*** 1.567*** 1.439*** 1.547***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.134) (0.106)
Race: Asian 20.191*** 20.190*** 20.181** 20.191***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.058) (0.050)
Race: Hispanic 0.943*** 0.953*** 0.986*** 0.943***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.124) (0.101)
Race: American
Indian
0.648*** 0.669*** 0.697*** 0.648***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Race: Other 20.146** 20.143** 20.078 20.146**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.055)
Application Years Included Included Included Included
Admitting School Included Included Included Included
N 17504 17504 11361 17504
AIC 22235 22219 15018 22235
**p,01; *** p,001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069258.t008
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the correspondence bias than individualistic ones [48,49].
Organizations often adopt practices because they are legitimate,
popular, or easy to justify [50,51]. That may help explain why we
observed such consistency in admissions policies in neglecting to
consider differences in grade distributions between institutions.
This sort of consistency in organizational ‘‘best’’ practices can
create incentives for individuals to play along, despite their
imperfections. Indeed, it is even conceivable that cultural or
linguistic norms can make it easier for individuals to follow
decision norms that are more easily understood by or explained to
others. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that finding a
better system to evaluate applicants would improve admissions
decisions, allowing the schools that do it to identify strong
candidates that other schools neglect. The Oakland Athletics
baseball team did just this when it pioneered a new statistical
approach to identifying promising baseball players to recruit [52].
Their success has since been emulated by other teams, changing
the way baseball’s talent scouts pick players. However, the
problem for admissions departments may be more complicated
because explicitly tarring some institutions as lenient-grading is
likely to elicit energetic protests if they ever find out about it [53].
It is common in organizations for the abilities of an individual, a
department, or a division to be shrouded in complicating or
confounding influences that make them difficult to detect or
measure [54]. Indeed, as much as ratings systems like grades and
performance metrics like on-time percentages can help clarify
standards for evaluation, they can also be used to obscure
performance [55]. Variation in grading standards between
institutions obscures the value of using grades to measure student
performance. It is probably in the interest of lenient-grading
institutions to hide the degree of their leniency. Consistent with
this motive, recent years have seen changes in the disclosure that
institutions are willing to make [56]. Fewer academic institutions
are willing to disclose average grading data or class rankings for
their students or alumni. When we contacted institutions to inquire
regarding average grades elite, expensive, private institutions –
those with the highest average grades – were most likely to decline
to disclose the information.
Organizational Image, Legitimacy, and Stakeholder
Appraisals
The strategic use of scoring and assessment metrics has
implications at the organization level because of the way that
institutions compete. Scott and Lane [57] advanced a theory of
organizational image in which stakeholders (both members as well
as outside audiences) play a key role in shaping the organization’s
image by making legitimacy appraisals that can counterbalance
the organization’s attempts at image management. This model is
built on the dual premises that organizations and their members
derive personal and economic benefits from promoting a positive
image [58,59], but that salient audiences have a role in validating
that image [60,61]. These forces form an equilibrium that
balances the organization’s incentives for an unbounded positive
spin with the utility gained by stakeholders from an image
grounded in reality. Scott and Lane [57] term the specific
mechanism by which this equilibrium is reached reflected stakeholder
appraisals. In the present paper we have investigated a setting in
which stakeholders may have difficulty judging the appropriate-
ness of image-relevant information which could then threaten the
stability of the reflected stakeholder appraisal equilibrium.
In the context of higher education, graduating students are
among the primary interfaces through which employers, graduate
schools, and communities interact with undergraduate institutions.
Their reputation in the form of grades contributes to the
reputation [62] of the organization. As such, undergraduate
institutions have an incentive to promote an image of intelligence
and achievement to these outside audiences by maintaining a
relatively high grade distribution. Given the tremendous value of
being able to place alumni in better graduate schools and in better
jobs, universities cannot be expected to go too far in seeking to
curtail grade inflation. For example, universities are unlikely to
implement meaningful institutional changes such as replacing
grades with percentile rankings. Instead, we should expect
academic institutions to pay lip service to the importance of high
academic standards while at the same time avoiding publicizing
average grade distributions and avoiding reporting class rank data
on their students.
Do we see unchecked escalation of grade distributions by a
market full of organizations unconstrained by the critical feedback
from shareholders? Of course, there are multiple mechanisms
supporting a moderate equilibrium even without functioning
shareholder criticism of the type we have described, but some data
suggest grade inflation is a prolonged and significant trend in U.S.
Education [6]. More troubling are anecdotal reports of institutions
manipulating their grade distribution with the publicly expressed
intent of influencing the selection decisions of hiring firms [63].
Clearly, these institutions are anticipating that employers will not
sufficiently discount the grades of their alumni to eliminate the
advantage their inflated grades will confer.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Our studies are subject to several important limitations. First,
the sample used in our first study was relatively small due to the
size of the admissions department that participated, even though
the results were highly significant. In addition, the first and second
studies employed hypothetical decisions, which may have limited
validity as a model of fully consequential and incentivized decision
making. Future research could benefit from a more qualitative
research approach to investigate how admissions and promotion
decisions are made by various organizations. As for Study 3, there
are many variables (such as variations in average GPA by
discipline within a school) for which we did lacked information and
thus could not control in our analyses. These variables may have
important influences on admission decisions that are not captured
in the present research. Although these are important limitations,
it is also worth noting that the limitations differ across studies and
yet the findings are robust.
The conclusions implied by our results as well as the limitations
of our research bring forth some fruitful and interesting possible
avenues for future research. One interesting question is whether
other academic selection contexts would show the same patterns as
business school admissions decisions. Law schools, for instance, use
the Law School Admissions Council, an organization that (among
other things) processes applications for law schools and provides a
service that gives schools a sense of where a given applicant’s GPA
falls relative to other applicants that the LSAC has seen from that
same institution. The Graduate Management Admissions Council
does not process business school applications and so does not
provide an equivalent service for business schools. Does the
LSAC’s assistance help law schools make better admissions
decisions?
Similarly, future research could explore the implications of the
correspondence bias for promotions of business professionals. Just
as educational institutions vary with respect to the ease of
achieving high grades, so do companies, industries, and time
periods differ with respect to the ease of achieving profitability.
There are some industries (such as airlines) that are perennially
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profitability. There are other industries (such as pharmaceuticals)
that have seen more stable profitability over time. And clearly
there are changes over time in industry conditions that drive
profitability; for example, global oil prices drive profitability
among oil companies.
We believe an important avenue for further investigation lies in
continuing the study of the correspondence bias in empirical
settings with organizationally-relevant outcomes. A more thorough
understanding of the implications of this common bias for
organizations could be achieved by further investigating business
decisions such as promotions. There are also a multitude of other
business decisions in which a latent variable of interest is seen in
the context of varying situational pressures. Investment returns,
sports achievements, and political success are all domains in which
judgments are vulnerable to the tendency to insufficiently discount
the influence of the situation. We expect that the correspondence
bias affects outcomes in these domains.
Our theory holds that a firm’s good fortune (in the form of
greater profits) will be mistaken as evidence for the abilities of its
managers. If this is so, then we should more often see employees of
lucky firms being promoted than of unlucky firms [64]. We would
expect, for instance, that pharmaceutical executives are more
likely to be hired away to head other firms than are airline
executives. However, this finding might be vulnerable to the
critique that pharmaceutical executives actually are more capable
than are airline executives–after all, their firms are more
consistently profitable. Therefore, a better way to test this
prediction would be using an industry (such as oil) in which
fortunes fluctuate over time due to circumstances outside the
control of any firm’s managers. Our prediction, then, would be
that oil executives are more likely to be hired away to head other
firms when the oil industry is lucky (i.e., oil prices are high) than
when the industry is unlucky (i.e., oil prices are low).
Theoretical Contributions
Our results contribute to the literature on the psychological
process at work in comparative judgment, a literature that
stretches across psychology [65], economics [66], and organiza-
tional behavior [67]. In this paper, we extend previous research by
examining judgmental contexts in which expert decision-makers
are comparing outcomes that vary with respect to both nominal
performances and their ease. We should also point out that these
results are, in a number of ways, more dramatic than the results of
previous research showing biases in comparative judgment.
Previous results have been strongest when participants themselves
are the focus of judgment [65,68]. Biases in comparative judgment
shrink when people are comparing others, and shrink still further
when they have excellent information about performance by those
they are comparing [69]. Biases disappear when comparisons are
made on a forced ranking scale [70]. In this paper, we have shown
comparative judgments to be powerfully biased even when people
are evaluating others about whom they have complete information
(as modeled in Study 1), and even when the assessments (e.g.,
admission decisions) are made on a forced distribution that
prevent them from rating everyone as better than everyone else.
Although attribution biases have been extensively studied, the
vast majority of this research has been conducted with conve-
nience samples of students. This raises the familiar concern that
deviations from normative decision outcomes are the result of
insufficient motivation, or that they could be corrected with
sufficient experience. Indeed, some studies have found that experts
often employ superior decision strategies and enjoy more positive
outcomes [71]. Our results however, suggest that experts do not
discount nominal performance in light of information about the
situation any differently than students in a hypothetical admissions
task [35]. The robustness of this effect in expert populations
connects a well-known psychological phenomenon to a world of
selection decisions with tangible and troubling implications.
Finally, our work contributes to research on human resource
and employment decisions. Previous research has examined a
number of factors that influence employment decisions such as
hiring and promotion. For instance, research suggests that
objective applicant qualifications, such as education or work
experience, play a large role in hiring and selection decisions
[72,73] but are often subject to situational factors. One of the
qualifications previous studies have examined is applicants’
general mental ability, which is often measured using the
applicants’ GPA. Consistently, research has demonstrated that
an applicant’s GPA influences evaluation and subsequent hiring
decisions [74,75]. Our results contribute to this literature by
suggesting that future studies may benefit from also including
information about the average GPA of the institution where the
applicant studied, or other appropriate measures of situational
influence.
Conclusion
Each of our studies supports the hypothesis that people rely
heavily on nominal performance (such as GPA) as an indicator of
success while failing to sufficiently take into account information
about the distributions of performances from which it came. To
the extent that admissions officers and hiring managers generally
show the same biases we found, graduate programs and businesses
are collectively choosing to select candidates who demonstrated
their merit in favorable situations rather than selecting the best
candidates. The consequences could be substantial for both the
sufficiently qualified but unselected candidates as well as for the
organizations that systematically select lower performing candi-
dates than they could.
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